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THE INTELLECTUAL AS SOCIAL REFORMER: 
MACHIAVELLI AND THOMAS MOREQ 
Y SUBJECT in these lectures is the intellectual as 
social refoimer, with particular reference to two six- 
teenth-century figures. 
We may do well to start with the simple fact that the in- 
tellectual is almost inevitably a reformer. If a man sets him- 
self to ponder hard and long about some big problem-such 
as the nature of God or of man or of society or of the uni- 
verse-if he honestly tries to take all the relevant facts into 
account and to develop an intelligible theory about his prob- 
lem, as a good intellectual does, then he is going to become 
dissatisfied with what he finds. If it is God and the universe 
that interest him, he may have to limit himself to criticizing 
other people's theories. But if it is man and society, he will 
be tempted to point out a few actual things that are wrong, 
why they are wrong, and how they can be remedied. Seeing 
things whole generally has this effect. No sooner does Mr. 
Toynbee get well into his vast Study of History, for instance, 
than we realize that he is pointing out quite a few things 
that are wrong with our Western society and calling on us 
to mend our ways. 
At the dawn of the modern era, two supremely articulate 
figures happened to exemplify most of the significant prob- 
lems of the intellectual as social reformer: his strengths and 
weaknesses, how he comes by his ideas, what gives him his 
social passion, and what lends his work enduring quality. 
They were Niccolb Machiavelli and Thomas More. Their 
lives and writings are perfectly familiar to educated people, 
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and I do not expect to tell you any facts about either that 
you do not already know. What I propose to do is to look at 
them from a somewhat fresh perspective: as pioneers of the 
idea that society-not individuals alone-can be changed, and 
that for various good and sufficient reasons, it must be. The 
fact is that Machiavelli and More inaugurated modem polit- 
ical thinking by sensing and facing what proved to be 
some of the most crucial problems of our modern Western 
society. Neither had much influence on the technical polit- 
ical theory of his day. But between them they gave us two 
words which have absorbed a heavy freight of meaning in 
the intervening centuries: "Machiavellian" and "Utopian." 
And this is one measure of their stature and importance, even 
if Machiavelli was no "Machiavellian" and More no "Uto- 
pian"-as they were not. Together they represent the first 
tough-minded but imaginative thinking about modem politi- 
cal, social, and economic problems. And together they sym- 
bolize the perennial tension between the two polar attitudes 
on these problems: that of the 'kealist7' and that of the 
<L 
moralist." 
It was worth recalling some of the main contrasts and coin- 
cidences between the two before we go further. Europe was 
culturally and spiritually more united in 1500 than it is today, 
but there were sharp contrasts between Machiavelli's Italy, 
with its welter of weaIthy independent cities, and More's 
England, one of the better-run national monarchies of its 
day. Machiavelli was born in Florence in 1469; Thomas More 
in London nine years later. They never met nor (so far as we 
know) ever read each other's works. Machiavelli spent his 
younger years in active civil service, his later years in bitter 
enforced retirement. More spent his early years in private life 
and long resisted the call to service of his King, which he 
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entered in his later years. Machiavelli was driven to write by 
being dismissed from ofEce, More (in part) by being invited to 
assume office. Machiavelli wrote his major works in Italian 
for the perusal of a few and never published them during his 
lifetime; More wrote his most famous book in Latin and 
published it immediately to the delight of the learned all 
over Europe. They wrote simultaneously. Machiavelli dedi- 
cated his final version of The Prince to Lorenzo de' Medici 
in 1516, the same year More's Utopia came off the presses 
at Louvain. Machiavelli was a thorough pagan who never- 
theless never formally rejected Christianity, saw his son enter 
the priesthood, and died with a priest a t  his bedside. More 
was one of the great Christians of history, who nevertheless 
remained a layman all his life and is remembered today as 
much for his more worldly qualities as for his sainthood-his 
humor, his family life, his zest for classical learning, and his 
shrewd grasp of social problems. Machiavelli died a disap- 
pointed man in 1527, before word could reach him that 
another man had been given the public office he had long 
coveted. More died triumphantly on the scaffold in 1535, 
"the King's good servant," as he put it, "but God's first." 
Polar opposites, you may conclude-and there is much 
truth in this. But it is important not to forget what they had 
in common. Each of them represented a combination, not 
too common even in the Renaissance, of scholarly tastes and 
practical experience, of humanistic accomplishment and civil 
service. Each was a thorough humanist in the contem- 
porary sense of the word; that is, one who is convinced of 
the importance and relevance of classical study and who de- 
votes much of his time to it. At the same time, each was saved 
from the dilettantism of many contemporary humanists by 
his strong practical interests. Both believed in the e5cacy of 
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appealing to men's intelligence, but neither believed that an 
intellectual could change the world merely by writing books. 
Both wrote with exceptional clarity, and yet both managed 
to set their readers to arguing violently about what they 
really meant to say. The major conclusion of these arguments, 
which are now over four centuries old, seems to me to be 
this: that Machiavelli was a curiously idealistic realist, and 
that More was a strikingly realistic idealist, PoIar opposites 
with much in common, in other words. 
It is hard to describe the conditions surrounding the birth 
of modern political thought at the close of the Middle Ages 
without grossly distorting the picture by oversimplification. 
Perhaps the most direct way is to say that the political 
thought of the brilliant generation that included Machiavelli 
and More was the result of two things: the social tensions 
accompanying the dissolution of medieval institutions, and 
the simultaneous impact of the classical revival. 
At the close of the fifteenth century the medieval respub- 
Zica chktiana was disintegrating rapidly. The pattern was 
still there in men's minds, the pattern of a hierarchical 
society headed in its temporal aspects by the Emperor and 
in its spiritual aspects by the Pope. Most men still assumed 
that this pattern of feudal and ecclesiastical organization was 
God's design for Christendom. But the discrepancies be- 
tween the form and the reality were growing at a bewilder- 
ing pace. In parts of Europe-North Italy, for example- 
economic power lay in fact with a class which had no place 
in the pattern, the "middle class" of merchants, industrialists, 
lawyers, and scholars. Political power rested in an institution 
utterly unknown ta the medieval pattern, the sovereign, ter- 
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ritorial state. Within the busy, swarming cities of Italy there 
were careers wide open to talent-and hot competition to 
excel, whether as scholar or artist, professional soldier or 
political despot. And between the city-states there was a 
constant jockeying for territory and Lebewaum, a struggle 
for power untempered by any respect for higher authority 
of Pope or Emperor. Respect for legitimate authority, for 
what Burke would later call "precedent, prescription, and 
antiquity," was still dominant in much of Europe. But in 
Italy it yielded to admiration for talent and determination, 
inventiveness and virtuosity. In Burckhardt's famous phrase, 
the state was becoming "a work of art," not something given 
by God or rooted in immenlorial custom and tradition, but 
something man could mould and shape and form to suit his 
needs. In fourteenth- and fifteenth-century Florence, revolu- 
tions seemed to be the chief outdoor sport, and constitution- 
making the chief indoor amusement. Diplomacy too became 
an "ai-t," the product "of conscious reflection and calcula- 
tion,'' as did warfare and painting and business practice. It 
has often been remarked that in all this, Italy was a kind 
of microcosm of the modern world. 
In other words, something like the modern sovereign, 
territorial state and something like modern capitalistic prac- 
tice in commerce, industry, and even agriculture had ap- 
peared in the Europe of 1500. But there were no categories 
of thought through which these developments could be 
understood, let alone controlled. The Middle Ages had an 
unshakable sense of right and justice, but never any veiy 
effective way of enforcing the right. There was always a 
principle to cover every incident, a law to apply to every 
case, but there were no effective sanctions. The typical 
early medieval society, someone has said, was "all law and no 
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government." Now here were strong rulers and powerful 
merchants creating a kind of illegitimate order of their own. 
Was it enough simply to put them down as "tyrants" and 
"despots," 'monopolists" and "usurers," using the traditional 
categories of thought? "The old order was not good," Mach- 
iavelli wrote, "and none of us have known how to find a 
new.""e was speaking of the art of war, but the remark 
might serve as a symbol of the bewilderment of the thinkers 
of his generation as they searched for some new way of 
understanding what was going on around them. 
Our twentieth-century attitude in such a situation, I 
suppose, would be to say: ''Get our economists and political 
scientists on the problem; hire a staff, apply for a founda- 
tion grant, and rent an electronic calculator; if the money 
holds out, we should have the answers in a few years." 
Fortunately or unfortunately, there were no such methods or 
resources available in the generation of MachiavelIi and 
More. What was available was a new store of ancient political 
and social wisdom, and to this they turned with eagerness. 
Men began to reread Aristotle and Cicero, Thucydides and 
Polybius, Livy and Tacitus, with new purpose and under- 
standing. Here was a literature concerned with politics and 
morals, with civil and foreign war, with tyranny and revolu- 
tion, with justice and might-in other words, with every as- 
pect of the struggle for power, among individuals within the 
state and among states themselves. To thoughful fifteenth- 
century readers all this was exciting-far more relevant than 
medieval chronicle or scholastic philosophy-and of course 
more practical than a 'scientific method" still in its infancy. 
Their contemporary experience enabled them to understand 
the ancient writers, as schoolmen two centuries earlier could 
not have done; and their reading in turn deepened their 
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understanding of contemporary politics and diplomacy. 
Modem political thought, in other words, resulted from the 
coincidence of rapid social change with the classical revival 
at the close of the Middle Ages. As new economic and 
political practices came into almost intolerable conflict with 
older habits of thought, a relatively untapped storehouse of 
social insight was discovered, or rediscovered. The Prince, 
The Discourses on Livy, and Utopia were not the only prod- 
ucts of this fruitful coincidence, but they were perhaps the 
greatest. 
So far we have talked in very general and abstract terms. 
We have left out the factor which, to men of the Renaissance 
at least, was always the most important: the human factor. 
Unless these social tensions and political problems somehow 
got under one man's skin, unless the man concerned was 
endowed with more than the usual perspicacity and sensi- 
tivity, and unless something happened to set this man writ- 
ing, nothing so grandiose as "the birth of modern political 
thinking" would take place, of course. Therefore it is very 
relevant to our inquiry to ask what sort of character and 
experience Machiavelli brought to his writing, and how he 
came to write as he did. 
The two most prominent traits in his character appear 
very early: his carefully-nurtured habit of seeing things as 
they are rather than as they might be, and his contradictory 
passion to see his beloved city of Florence in the ideal state 
of civic peace and diplomatic security which he hoped 
might be, but which obviously did not exist in the 1490's. 
One of the earliest glimpses we get of him is in a letter he 
wrote to a friend in March, 1497, describing Savonarola's 
sermons. Machiavelli saw that the prophet's public addresses 
were becoming more hysterical as fear for his own power 
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grew. "He began," writes the cool young observer, "with 
terrifying horrors, showing with arguments that must have 
been veiy effective with people not trained to thinking, that 
his followers were very fine people while his opponents were 
the worst sort of rascals. He went on to any limit that 
seemed likely to weaken the hostile party and strengthen 
his own." There were two armies, Savonarola argued: &at 
of the Lord, which included him and his own followers, 
and that of Satan, which was composed, of course, of his 
enemies.' Savonarola, the "unarmed prophet" of The Prince, 
obviously made a deep impression on Machiavelli, but not 
as a model of intelligence or statesmanship, 
A month after Savonarola's execution, in June, 1498, 
Machiavelli got his 6rst job with the republican government 
of Florence, and for the next fourteen years he served as 
Chancellor and Secretary to the suling council of the city 
and as diplomatic envov on numerous legations-to Paris, 
to the Emperor, to the Pope, to Caesar Borgia, and to many 
of the neighboring city-states. The picture we get of him 
during these years is that of an exceptionally acute observer 
of the political scene, unquestioningly faithful to his govern- 
ment although sometimes critical of its policies, always 
conscious of the weakness of the city-state he represents, 
always anxious to compensate by sheer intelligence for this 
weakness by turning up ingenious solutions to unsolvable 
problems, yet usually aware of the grim limits on Florentine 
freedom of action. He is generally second-in-command on 
any given legation, not first-which suggests that his bosses 
valued his brains above his judgment. Occasionally he com- 
pares someone's policy with that of the Roman Republic in 
similar circumstances, to the advantage of the ancients, 
which suggests that although he is not a man of wide cul- 
ture, he is reading the ancient historians. 
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His two constant preoccupations are the disunity at home 
and the weakness abroad that make his government's job 
the nightmare that it is. The Pazzi Conspiracy of 1478, 
that lurid plot to murder Lorenzo the Magnificent in church, 
had made a deep impression on him at the age of nine, and 
all his life he was to be concerned with the problem of parte, 
or factions, and their disintegrating effect on the State. But 
an even deeper impression had been left on him by the inva- 
sion of Italy in 1494 by Charles VIII of France, the invasion 
that first revealed the startling inferiority of a land of petty, 
warring city-states to a well-organized national monarchyOs 
Five more times Italy was to be invaded before Machiavelli's 
government fell-once more by France, twice by the Em- 
peror, and twice by Spain. The last attack by Spain in 1512 
overthrew the republican regime in Florence and restored 
the Medici to power. In her weakness Florence had made an 
alliance with France, and in a stubborn display of civic 
honor, she stuck by the alliance long after it was clear that 
Spain was going to beat France out for control of the Italian 
peninsula. In another display of personal honor, Machia- 
velli's close friend and superior, Piero Soderini, refused to 
use unconstitutional means to save himself and his govern- 
ment in the crisis. In August, 1512, Soderini fled. Some two 
months later Machiavelli was dismissed from office. Two 
months after this, a plot to destroy the new Medici rulers 
was discovered, Machiavelli's name was found on a list of 
those to be approached, and Machiavelli himself was im- 
prisoned and tortured to reveal what he knew. Released in 
February, 1513, he retired to a house of his in the country 
ten miles south of the city, at Sant7 Andrea, where he had 
a tantalizing glimpse of the Duomo from his garden. And 
here he was left to put together the broken pieces of his 
life as well as he could, with a wife and four children to 
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support, no job, and no visible prospects of getting one. 
His letters during this crucial year 1513 to his friend 
Vettori (who was Florentine ambassador at Rome) and to 
Soderini (who had fled to Dalmatia) give fascinating glimpses 
of how a disappointed civil servant of a third-rate republic 
became the £isst modern analyst of political power. He was 
bored, frustrated, and resentful, worried about where the 
next meal was coming from, and acutely homesick for the 
world of politics and diplomacy which was his life's blood. 
Occasionally he wouId visit the city, but since he was on 
the outside looking in, this was almost worse than staying 
in the country. There he would leave the house in the morn- 
ings and try to kill time by chatting with his wood-cutters 
for a while. He would have a book under his arm-Dante, 
Petrarch, or Ovid-and for a while he would read, Then he 
would walk down to the local tavern, talking eagerly to 
everyone he'd meet on the way, "asking news of their towns, 
and listening to all sorts of stories as throwing light on the 
varying tastes and whims of men," he says. Then home for 
dinner at noon, then back to the tavern, where he would 
play cards with a butcher, a miller, and a couple of bakers 
the rest of the day. The stakes were small, but the emotion 
ran high-"just one battle after another with boundless 
rages and personal insults." "So with these lice clinging to 
my person," he writes, "I keep my brain dusted off somewhat 
and provide a vent for the cruelty of my lot," hoping the 
Fates would soon feel ashamed of themselves for what they 
had done to him.* 
He knew perfectly clearly that he was fitted for one career 
and one only. At forty-three he could not become a mer- 
chant or farmer overnight. If only he could talk to Vettori, 
he writes. "Fortune has so devised that since I cannot talk 
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of the silk trade or the wool trade or of profit and loss, I 
have to talk of politics. I have only one choice: either to 
talk of politics or to take a vow of silence."' His mind runs 
restlessly over recent events-every state breaking treaties 
but Florence, every statesman forgetting the ordinary rules 
of morality but Soderini with his constitutional scruples. 
He has come to the conclusion, he writes Soderini, that the 
sole criterion of policies should be their results, not the 
means used to attain them. The same end can be attained 
by different means, just as you can get to the same place 
by difFerent roads. "Just why digerent procedures should 
now help and now hinder, I do not know," he writes, "but 
I would like to know." He suggests the answer is that "times 
and circumstances" change, and that the means suitable for 
one time are disastrous for a n ~ t h e r , ~  Vettori asks him what 
he thinks of the latest move of Ferdinand, King of Spain. 
Isn't it foolish? Machiavelli jumps at the chance to put his 
rusting intellect to work and writes ten pages in reply. 
There is really no problem, he says, if you see that Ferdinand 
is not much of a statesman-just lucky. His letter will seem 
a jumble, he concludes apologetically, but he is in the 
count~y, never sees a human face (Machiavelli was always 
given to exaggeration), and knows "nothing of what is going 
on in the world."' Later he argues that Vettori overrates 
Venetian power; the real danger to Italy comes from the 
Swiss and the French. '1 don't know just what Aristotle says 
about countries that have been destroyed. What interests 
me more than theory is what is, what has been, and what 
may reasonably happen."* 
Then in the most famous letter he ever wrote (10 Decem- 
ber 1513)Wachiavelli tells Vettori how when evening 
comes, he is in the habit of putting off his soiled clothes, 
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putting on his court dress, and spending four hours of unin- 
terrupted bliss in the company of his favorite classical 
authors. With them he partakes of that food which alone he 
can call his own and for which he was born, he says. He 
asks them questions, and they answer, Since Dante says 
there is no knowing apart from remembering, he has put 
down on paper some of the things he has learned from 
these older and wiser minds. "I have written a pamphlet 
which I am calling On Principalities. In it I go as deeply as I 
can into the subject, discussing the definition of monarchy, 
how many kinds of monarchies there are, and how they are 
won, held, and lost. . . . Any head of a state, and especially a 
new one, should find it intei-esting." He explains frankly 
that he is dedicating it to Giuliano de' Medici because he 
desperately needs a job and hopes the Medici will give him 
one. "Anybody, it seems to me, should be glad to have the 
services of a man who has acquired so much experience at 
the expense of other employers. Of my trustworthiness there 
could be no doubt. Having so long kept faith with people, I 
would not be likely to begin betraying now. A man who 
has kept his word loyally for forty-three years, as I have, 
could not change his nature very easily. The fact that I am a 
poor man is proof of my loyalty and honor." Four times the 
word fede (faith) occurs in these last sentences.1° Obviously 
the writer is deeply concerned to impress even on his friend, 
who must know it, that patriotism and his pledged word 
come before party loyalty with him. 
This then was the origin of The Prince. Perhaps it is 
evident from this account why those who have read the 
book over the years have argued-and still argue violently- 
over its purpose and meaning. Was it simply a cool, disillu- 
sioned analysis of how to get and hold on to power, with 
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the last patriotic chapter added as a sort of afterthought to 
give the analysis some respectable use? Or did it, on the 
contrary, all lead up to the last chapter? Was it an honest 
and passionate appeal to the Medici to become the saviors 
of Italy from the foreign barbarians? Did the author really 
mean what he said about playing the beast rather than the 
man, seeming to have the private virtues but not being 
hampered by them, breaking faith if it was to your ad- 
vantage? Was this the Machiavelli who was so proud of his 
own word once given and of his republic's reputation for 
good faith? Was he perhaps being satiric in The Prince, 
showing up despotism for what it really was so that all the 
people could take warning? Or was he even trying to trap 
the young Medici into following his precepts and thus getting 
themselves thrown out of Florence by an outraged popu- 
lace, so that Machiavelli's republican party could get back 
in? Was he thoroughIy immoral in what he said-or simply 
amoral-or was he sketching a new sort of morality-or was 
he beneath it all as thoroughly moral as any medieval school- 
man, but simply disillusioned with the way things actually 
were in his day?ll 
I know you will expect me to answer these questions with 
some nice neat formula, but I cannot. Nor do. I know anyone 
that can. All of these theories about the meaning of Mach- 
iavelli's Prince were broached before the sixteenth-century 
came to a close, and all of them are in one way or another 
still alive today. Very recent research, however, has opened 
up some exciting new perspectives on the development of 
Machiavezs thought after 1513, and I think it is possible 
to report a common-sense view of the significance of Mach- 
iavelli's thought that represents a sort of scholarly con- 
sensus?= 
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The Prince was written at white-hot speed in the fall of 
1513. Into it went a good many disparate, and even con- 
tradictory, emotions and desires: resentment about his mis- 
fortune, disillusionment with legal and moral ways of doing 
things if this was where they landed you, desire to under- 
stand what had happened and how to avoid its happening 
again, desire to show off his political perspicacity to the 
new rulers of Florence in order to get his job back, a hope 
that out of writing some good would come-to him, to Flor- 
ence, to Italy, perhaps even to posterity. In every chapter- 
some more clearly than others-he was trying to do two 
things at once: to understand and to reform. The two were 
related in a simple enough way: without understanding 
there could be no. reform. The reason why reform schemes 
of intellectuals have invariably failed in the past, he is 
convinced, is that they have not been founded on politics 
as they actually are. He is acutely aware that he is breaking 
with tradition, with the "Mirror of Princes" literature which 
urged princes to act like good men and assumed everything 
would be all right if they did. "My intention being to write 
something of use to those who understand, it appears to 
be more proper to go to the real truth of the matter" than to 
imaginary states which have never existed, he says. What .Is 
done is so far removed from what mg7zt to be done that 
anyone who wants to seize and hold power must "learn 
how not to be good." The Prince is a sharp but desperate 
appeal to certain fellow Florentines in high places-desperate 
because it appeals to men who have forgotten God and who 
have over-civilized man-to play the beast, in order to gain 
a certain measure of civic independence and individual 
dignity. I t  is all too easy to point out the glaring flaw in the 
argument. If the goal is really "to found a new realm and 
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adorn it with good laws, good arms, good friends, and good 
examples," as chapter 24 seems to suggest-and this is esti- 
mating the goal at its best-will this end be achieved by 
the means suggested or will the means corrupt the end? Does 
obsession with the power factors involved in any political 
situation result in a regime adorned with '"ood laws" and 
"good examples," or does it result merely in irresponsible 
depotism and more corruption? 
Machiavelli never really faced up to this question, but he 
was too intelligent to ignore it entirely. Whether by orig- 
inal design or not, The Prince became a sort of "Part I" to a 
larger work in Machiavelli's mind, a book on republics. In 
1514, the year after he finished The Prince, Machiavelli 
was again bored. He wrote Vettoii he was not reading the 
ancients or discoursing on the moderns any more because in 
spite of advancing middle age he had fallen in love again. 
But the pull of his old interests was stronger even than the 
delights of Venus, By 1515 he seems to have been visiting 
the city regularly to discuss the classical historians with 
congenial friends in the Rucellai gardens, and between 1515 
and 1517 The Discourses on Livy had taken shape. 
Felix Gilbert sees evidence of development from the 
"realism" and contemporaneity of The Prince to the "ideal- 
ism" and classicism of The Discaur~es.'~ As Machiavelli got 
further away from his political career in time, he became 
more of an intellectual and a scholar. Influenced by his 
humanist friends, he saw things in larger perspective and 
began to elaborate his long-term ideal in a lengthy com- 
mentaiy on the classical historian Livy. The Prince was 
for a moment of political corruption and crisis. The Dis- 
courses were to be for a better time, for all time. The ideal, 
of course, was the Roman Republic. The Discourses were 
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concerned with the reasons for Rome's greatness and (by 
implication) the rules for success which apply to any state. 
Machiavelli, although probably not an atheist, had elimin- 
ated God from any effective part in history. He had elim- 
inated eternity and infinity as the csiteria by which political 
success is to be judged, and so was left with duration in time 
and extension in space. Rome was great because her regime 
lasted so long and because her rule extended so widely. 
Careful study of her history would reveal general rules for 
success which could be compressed into maxims and applied 
to the contemporary situation, since human nature never 
changes and history constantly repeats itself. That is, the 
same human beings will be continually going through the 
same typical political experiences in the future as in the 
past-and if you know the rules of the game and the record- 
book, you will naturally do better than if you don't. 
"I have resolved to open a new ~~oute ,  which has not yet 
been followed by anyone," Machiavelli writes at the begin- 
ning of The Discou~*ses.~* If the results are effective, he adds, 
"I shall at least have shown the way to others, who will 
carry out my views with greater ability, eloquence, and 
judgment." What is this "new route"? I t  is the serious study 
of history with a view to developing a science of politics 
as a yardstick for social reform. Everyone reads and admires 
the ancients, he says, but no one cloes anything about his 
reading. The trouble is that men read history for fun when 
they ought to read it for profit. Machiavelli hopes that those 
who read his book will derive "those advantages which 
should be the aim of all study of history." By "advantages" 
he means both knowledge and inspiration: knowledge of the 
ides  for political success (meaning the power to endure and 
the power to expand), and inspiration to follow these rules 
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through the illustrious example of the ancient Romans, both 
as individuals and as a people. He concludes his preface to 
the Second Book on a poignantly personal note, the peren- 
nial hope of the man of action turned intellectual: "It is the 
duty of an honest man to teach others that good which the 
malignity of the times and of fortune has prevented his 
doing himself; so that among the many capable ones whom 
he has instructed, some one perhaps, more favored by 
Heaven, may perform it."15 
The "new route," with all its presuppositions and sur- 
prising implications, is all compressed into one arresting 
paragraph, which merits quoting in full: 
Whoever considers the past and present will readily observe 
that all cities and all peoples are and ever have been ani- 
mated by the same desires and passions; so that it is easy, 
by diligent study of the past, to foresee what is likely to hap- 
pen in the future in any republic, and to apply those remedies 
that were used by the ancients, or, not Ending any that were 
employed by them, to devise new ones from the similarity 
of events. But as such considerations are neglected or not 
understood by most of those who read, or, if understood by 
these, are unknown to those who govern, it follows that the 
same troubles generally recur in all republics.la 
What Machiavelli seems to say here is that because human 
nature is always the same and because history goes round 
in cycles, knowledge and prediction are possible. But since 
the endless revolution in cycles seems to depend on men's 
ignorance of the process, knowledge of its rules and "reme- 
dies" may somehow break the cyclical process and histoly 
may straighten out into progress in a straight line. Whether 
he meant to say this or not, I am not sure. The important 
point is that Machiavelli was trying to use the best of the 
scientist's and the humanist's approach to truth, in an age 
which knew little real differentiation between them. The 
humanist finds wisdom and insight in tradition, and values 
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continuity; the scientist finds new truth in careful observa- 
tion and rational analysis, and values independence from 
tradition. Machiavelli went back to the ancients as author- 
ity, like a good humanist, and found in them the hope of 
developing a science of political behavior, like a good 
scientist. He had the humanist's belief in the power of 
direct inspiration from historical study, and the scientist's 
belief in the power of detached observation and rational 
interpretation. He was more of a scientist than any political 
writer of his day, more of a humanist than most political 
scientists today. 
It is important to note, however, that it is Machiavelli 
the humanist rather than Machiavelli the scientist who is 
alive today. The carefully-elaborated structure of political 
generalizations, theorems, and maxims which he erected 
with such assurance has crumbled away. It never became 
the foundation for our modern social sciences, which have 
found other more carefully-tested supports. I t  was too early 
to found an experimentally grounded science of man. But to 
the practical politician and the statesman, to the self-seeker 
and the public benefactor alike, Machiavelli the humanist, 
the political artist, the clear-sighted but hot-blooded inter- 
preter of power politics is stiIl very much alive. Both dicta- 
tors and democrats read him, scholars and men of affairs 
pay tribute to him, even theologians now appreciate him. 
Why? What did he really accomplish that was so important? 
What were his strengths and limitations as seen from four 
centuries away? 
I suppose the answer is that he really did find a "new 
route," a new intellectual and moral framework in which to 
set the confusing political developments of his day-a frame- 
work so satisfying to many political thinkers and actors 
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that it still in use today. This new perspective might be set 
down somewhat summarily as follows: 
The world of men in which we find ourselves is a treach- 
erous, constantly-changing affair. Whether it is ultimately 
an ordered cosmos we do not know, but it does not look 
as if it were. Man is alone in this world and on his own. Most 
men are ignorant, ambitious, ungrateful, and not to be 
trusted. Among individuals and groups there is a constant 
struggle for power. Human desires are limitless. When am- 
bition ceases to drive men on, fear takes over and does the 
job. Democracies and republics are just as insatiable for 
power under certain circumstances as dictatorships and de- 
potisms. There are no "safe" courses in diplomacy and poli- 
tics, only choices between evils and dangers. In this world 
there are a few-only a few-who have intelligence, courage, 
and public spirit. If these few will only exercise their brains 
and wills, and not be squeamish about the means they use, 
perhaps some limited good may be achieved, some stability 
gained in the midst of flux, some virtue in the midst of 
corruption. The best we can do is to study the repetitive 
patterns of our social existence as carefully as we can, decide 
upon the best courses, choose our ways with intelligence 
and boldness, and stick by our choices with determination. 
Machiavelli saw the essentially demonic nature of power. 
He saw that power is never tamed by moral precepts and 
that often the worst anarchy is the result of the best inten- 
tions. He never doubted the value of personal morality, as 
his own career proved, but he came to feel that there is a 
political morality which has its own autonomy and which 
must inevitably cancel out personal morality in moments 
of crisis. He was a ruthless critic of all who dreamed of ends 
without any concern for whether the means existed to attain 
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them-and of all who saw how to attain their ends but lacked 
the courage to act on their insight. "It very seldom happens 
that a good man is willing to become prince by bad means, 
though his object be good," he remarked ruefully. "Men 
know not how to be gloriously wicked or perfectly good. . . . 
And when a crime has something of grandeur and nobility 
in it, they flin~h.'"~ 
This last sentence suggests some of the classic caveats 
about Machiavelli as political analyst and refomer-because 
men have been "&inching" from his doctrine ever since they 
learned of it. The new political morality which he sketched 
out was purely pragmatic, to be tested not by intentions 
but by results. There was little if any continuity between 
this political morality and the traditional personal morality 
of the classical and Christian traditions. Machiavelli's state, 
it has often been remarked, was as isolated, as self-sufficient, 
as proud and free-standing as a Renaissance statue. He found 
"a new order" as he hoped, but it had too little continuity, 
too little organic relationship with the old for healthy, well- 
balanced growth. He saw two of the dimensions of power, 
the physical and the intellectual. And perhaps he tended to 
exaggerate both: not only the power of the pen (exaggera- 
tion here is par-for-the-course with intellectuals in general), 
but also the power of the sword (exaggeration here is what 
happens when intellectuals lean over backward to prove 
that they are tough-minded men of affairs: ccScholars and 
literary men often seem more given to the inverted idealism 
of Realpolitik than working diplomats," Garrett Mattingly 
observes1"). But in a sense Machiavelli missed the third 
dimension of power, the moral dimension. I t  is possible to 
argue that Machiavelli, the consummate realist, the resolute 
facer of thing-as-they-are, had one blind-spot which made 
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him unable to see the reality of moral and spiritual forces 
in the lives of men. 
This leaves us with a final paradox. The penetration and 
profundity of Machiavelli's thought is integrally related to 
his experience as a human being, as is all great thought in 
the humanities. What a man has learned in the venture of 
living, as husband, father, and citizen, has a great deal to 
do with how deeply he can penetrate as philosopher or poet 
or artist or student of literature, or even as historian and 
political scientist. Machiavelli's experience as a man and 
as a bureaucrat, taken together with his dismissal from 
office, were the origins of his political thought, both in its 
greatness and in its limitations, Two of his most famous 
maxims-that it is necessary on occasions for a prince to 
break his faith, and that deliberate frightfulness is often a 
good thing-are evidences of a sort of emotional high tension 
which can be traced to his political disappointment (there 
is hardly a trace of either of these doctrines in his letters 
before his dismissal in 1512). So it could be said-with the 
soundest psychiatric backing, I am sure-that if Machiavelli 
had only got his job back, or had learned to accept the 
frustration of his political ambition with more equanimity, 
we would have had a less cynical, less amoral, and better 
balanced political doctrine from him. I agree. But the para- 
dox is that in this case he would never have written it down 
at all. 
Some five years after Machiavelli's death, a close student 
of his little book on The Prince, Thomas Cromwell, became 
the chief minister of King Henry VIII of England. His only 
rival for the King's favor, Thomas More, had resigned as 
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Lord Chancellor the day after the clergy acknowledged 
Henry as Supreme Head of the Church of England in place 
of the Pope (May, 1532). Cromwell brought More a message 
from the King soon after his resignation, and they had a 
lengthy talk. At the end, More said: "Master Cromwell, you 
are now entered into the service of a most noble, wise, and 
liberal prince; if you will follow my poor advice, you shall, 
in your counsel-giving unto his Grace, ever tell him what he 
ought to do, but never what he is able to do. . . . For if a 
lion knew his own strength, hard were it for any man to 
rule him." More's biographer remarks that we can think of 
Chis interview "as one where the Utopian faced the Mach- 
iavellian, provided we use these words without prejudice. . . . 
It was not necessarily idealism facing villainy."1° 
Whatever it was, the wider issues behind this confronta- 
tion-moralism us, realism, what ought to be us. what is- 
have fascinated students of Utopia and The Prince all the 
way from Jean Bodin in the later sixteenth century to Ger- 
hard Ritter in the twentieth. Ritter, a non-Nazi but national- 
istic German historian writing just at the opening of the 
Second World War, used Machiavelli and More as pegs 
on which to hang reflections on the contrast between con- 
tinental and English political thinking, between German 
realism born of continental power politics and English moral- 
ism born of insular isolation." Bodin, writing four centuries 
earlier in the midst of a civil war, tried to find his own 
balance between Machiavelli's disillusionment and More's 
never-never land. I have found students unfailingly inter- 
ested and aroused to battle by my asking them to assume 
that Machiavelli's Prince and More's Utopia actually exist, 
then to imagine what happens if the Prince lands on Utopia, 
Will he be helpless, or will he have the place organized in a 
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few months? So long as men continue to be worried about 
the relation between might and right, between politics and 
morality, these two thinkers, who were working away at 
their rival schemes of reform during the same years about 
a thousand miles away from each other, will remain alive 
in the memory of Western society. 
The political and intellectual environment in which the 
young Thomas More grew up was of course different from 
Macl~iavelli's Florence. The underlying problems were the 
same: the decay of medieval institutions, the growth of 
strong centers of political power, and the spread of capital- 
istic practices in the economy. But there was more con- 
tinuity with the immediate past in More's England, and the 
social tensions resulting from change took different forms. 
Henry VII, the first Tudor, had pretty well scotched the 
danger of feudal anarchy by strengthening the monarchy, 
building up a surplus in the treasury, holding a tight rein 
on the nobility, and keeping England out of war abroad. 
His methods were not always sc~-upulous, but it took hard- 
headed policies to deal with pretenders to his shaky throne 
and with overmighty subjects. Since the end result was 
peace and order and surcease of civil war, Machiavelli would 
have approved-and so have most modem historians. But a 
sensitive contemporary might well have been dismayed by 
Henry's financial exactions, his enforcement of long-forgot- 
ten laws to raise money, and his practice of getting a grant 
from Parliament for a war, then calling off the war and 
keeping the money. The same sensitive observer might well 
have been disturbed for different reasons by the adventur- 
ous foreign policy of his son, Henry VIII, Within five years 
of coming to the throne in 1509, Henry VIII had squandered 
his father's surplus on a futile war with France, the chief 
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motive of which was to gain glory for the young monarch. 
Machiavelli, you will remember, was impressed by two 
things as he was growing to maturity; the factional fights 
which tore his native city to pieces, and its weakness with 
respect to the big powers of the day. More, on the other 
hand, was a subject of one of the better-run national mon- 
archies of the sixteenth-century. His country had just come 
through a time of troubles but was now sbong, united, and 
in no danger of invasion or conquest. In fact, if there was 
any danger, it was that England would let her recovery go 
to her head and dissipate her new-found strength in con- 
tinental adventures. There was little danger any more of 
organized feudal revolt or lawlessness. But there were dis- 
turbing signs that the energies of the ruling class, which had 
once gone into the wars with France and the Wars of the 
Roses, were now going into economic exploitation of the 
people and cut-throat competition for favor at the court, 
More was the son of a London lawyer, and he spent some 
years in his teens as a page in the household of Cardinal 
Morton, a churchman of integrity and devotion. It was 
natural for hini to look at the social problen~s of his day 
through the eyes of a city-dweller or of a clergyman. The 
danger, as he would see it, was not so much anarchy as 
tyranny, not so much urban factions as feudal greed and 
arrogance, not so much national weakness as national aggres- 
siveness. 
The intellectual influence of overwhelming importance 
on More was Christian humani~m.~' It is hard today to 
recapture the enthusiasm of the Christian humanists- 
Redchlin, Erasmus, Lefhvre d'Etaples, John Colet, and More 
himself-because what they believed possible seems utterly 
unrealistic as we look back on it. They believed they could 
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save their society by reviving the best in both classical and 
Christian antiquity, going back to Plato and the Gospels, 
reconciling the two traditions, and stripping off all medieval 
accretions and distortions. They were Christian intellectuals 
with an infectious belief in the power of good scholarship 
and proper education. They thought that if men only knew 
what Socrates said and what Jesus preached, if men could 
only be made to see the gulf between apostolic Christianity 
and sixteenth-cen tury Christianity, reform would inevitably 
follow. No one could stop it, once men of intelligence and 
good-will had been exposed to the best that had come down 
from ancient Greece and Palestine. Erasmus met More on 
his first trip to England in 1499, and for the next twenty 
years he and More and John Colet were in close touch with 
each other, plotting the strategy of a Christian humanism 
which would overthrow scholasticism, restore knowledge of 
the best in pagan and Christian antiquity, and ultimately 
revive a compt and war-tom Christendom. 
Practically all of these men were pure intellectuals- 
writers, teachers, scholars, with no professional responsibility 
for carrying into practice the reforms they advocated. 
Thomas More was the outstanding exception: a deeply- 
devoted Christian and a scholar in all his instincts, but one 
who was called early to a busy and exhausting career as a 
lawyer and public official. The strong streak of Christian 
piety in him almost led him to become a Carthusian monk, 
and he never entirely put aside the possibility, always ad- 
mired the monastic ideal, and secretly wore a hair-shirt next 
to his skin all his life. But he remained a layman, married, 
begot a large family, and followed in his father's footsteps 
in the law, soon combining his private practice with the 
office of Under Sheriff of the City of London. The duties of 
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this office are not clear, but More's chief job seems to have 
been to represent the interests of the London merchant com- 
munity in legal relationships with the Crown. Henry VIII 
and Wolsey came to know the young lawyer and covet his 
services for the Crown. Just when the King began to press 
More to enter the royal service we do not know, but we find 
llirn a member of an embassy to the Netherlands in the 
summer of 1515, still merely representing the City's interests 
on an ad hoc mission and not yet a royal official. 
The embassy proved to be an important event in More's 
life. Apparently there were lulls in the negotiations (as there 
always are) while both sides waited for further instiuctions 
from home. More visited an old friend, Peter Giles, in Ant- 
werp, and there was time for talk, for thought, and for 
writing. Somehow, away from his family, away from his 
native land, temporarily unoccupied by the press of busi- 
ness, he began to let his imagination take flight. The world 
was surely in a parlous state, as perhaps it always had been, 
More had seen its seamy side as a lawyer. He was a good 
lawyer, but hated most of what he had to do, He was 
peculiarly sensitive to what happens to the littIe man in the 
toils of the law an3 the clutches of the rich. He knew that 
the economic revolution which had struck England-the con- 
version of arable land to pasture because of the profit to be 
made from sheep-faiming-was causing niiseiy and suffer- 
ing among the poor. Unemployment led to vagabondage, 
vagabondage to thievery; then the thieves were punished 
by a savage death penalty-which did not stop the thievery 
or save the souls of the victims. Meanwhile the rich squan- 
dered the profits of their exploitation and monopoly on 
clothes, servants, and luxuries. Everywhere pride, greed, and 
idleness-and among princes, nothing but a ceaseless and 
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senseless struggle for more gold and more territory. Not a 
pretty picture-and surely an excuse for cynicism. 
How would it look, however, to a Christian humanist? 
There were certain unexploited resources in the classical 
and Christian traditions which might be utilized to help 
solve sixteenth-century problems, if only they could be 
brought vividly before men's imaginations. This matter of 
"mine-and-thine," for instance, which was at the root of all 
the trouble: Plato Itnew that if his governors were to de- 
velop any true sense of community among themselves, priv- 
ate property must be denied them. The first apostles held 
all their goods in common, and the first rule of all truly 
strenuous Christianity communities ever since had been 
renunciation of property. Granted that man will always 
remain a sinner. Still, his nature is to a large extent the 
product of his environment. What if he should take seriously 
the ideals of Plato's Republic and the medieval monastery? 
Wasn't it theoretically possible to build a society based on 
communism of goods in which pride in its way of life and 
satisfaction with the results would curb the natural tendency 
to greed of its individual members? Perhaps such a society 
actually existed, now, somewhere in the vast expanses of 
the world recently opened up to wondering European eyes 
since Columbus's momentous voyage twenty-three years be- 
fore. At any rate, the startling tales of mariners baclc from 
the New World and walking the streets of Antwerp sug- 
gested that this sort of thing was not beyond believing. 
This is a not altogether fanciful account of what went 
through More's head in the summer of 1515 as he whiled 
away the time at Peter Giles's in Antwerp. It is based, of 
course, on what came out of his head at the end of the 
summer: namely, a manuscript describing the people and 
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customs of "Utopia," and representing Book I1 of what we 
have in print today plus the first five pages of Boolc I as 
preface.22 I t  was a startingly original combination of daring 
imagination and hard realism, lightened by turns of sheer 
wit and horseplay. Almost every feature of Utopian life 
and thought (except the more obviously humorous bits) was 
designed as a remedy or palliative to some concrete social 
evil which More knew at first-hand. His realistic lawyer's 
grasp of his own society, its economic, social, and political 
problenls, lay behind every flight of the imagination. He 
drew on his wide knowledge of classical and Christian litera- 
ture for ideas, but there was no literal copying of tradition 
anywhere. For instance, communism in Utopia is the way 
of life of the whole nation, not of a few governors (as in 
Plato) or of an isolated group (as in the monastery); yet 
there is still much of P1ato7s and St. Benedict's spirit in it. 
Not only in detail, but also in the architecture of the 
whole, the second book of Utopia is a Christian humanist's 
carefuIly-developed remedy for the three key sins of English 
society-sloth, greed, and especially pride-as the brilliant 
little study of J. H. Hexter shows so convincingly." Every- 
one is compelled to work in Utopia so that idleness may 
never become a badge of social privilege. Greed is nipped 
in the bud by providing everyone with economic security. 
And pride is given nothing to feed upon, at least in the 
individual's life. With true Christian insight, More rates 
pride as a deadlier sin than greed-"the princess and mother 
of all mischief," in fact. Without pride, without the limitless 
desire to outshine other persons, to show off, to out-spend 
and out-consume all social rivals, to play God on earth, 
greed would be comparatively easy to handle, More seems 
to suggest. At any rate, the strict and dreary egalitarianism 
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of Utopia is designed just as clearly to exterminate pride 
as it is to curb avarice. 
We need not enter into the tangle of later arguments 
about the meaning of Utopia-whether it is more "human- 
istic" or more "Christian," whether it looks back to the 
Middle Ages or folward to Karl Marx, for instance. The 
question whether More was fundamentally serious or just 
writing for fun, however, is relevant. There seems to be 
little doubt, since the fine biography of R. W. Chambers 
some twenty years ago, that More's intent was serious: to 
show how an ideal society based on reason alone without the 
benefit of revelation, might still put to shame a Christian 
society which did not live up to the truth revealed to it, The 
literalist can of course walk heavy-footed through Utopia 
and show you that More didn't mean this or that seriously, 
and the pedant can prove that it's all a story told by an old 
traveler and that More never said he believed it. But there 
is too much in both the design and detail of Utopia that has 
the ring of passionate sincerity about it for any thoughtful 
reader to doubt that the writer was trying to get something 
across. If we can still argue about what Erasmus was trying 
to do in his Praise of Folly and Machiavelli in The P~*ince, 
it is natural to wonder about what More meant to accom- 
plish by picturing an imaginary island, remarkably like 
England in geography and remarlcably unlike England in 
social customs, supposedly in actual existence here and now, 
removed from Europe not in time but simply by space- 
which was quite different from either Plato's Republic or 
Augustine's City of God, incidentally. I thinlc he was trying 
to say: stretch your imaginations, exercise your fancy, get 
out of the mental ruts men have been in for centuries, stop 
reconciling yourselves to social evil as inevitable, and keep 
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steadily before you the picture of what might be as the 
measure of what is. You may not, and probably will not, 
set up communism of goods overnight, h i  seems t o  say, but 
if you have seriously considered the advantages of a com- 
munist society, at least you will never again look on private 
property as an absolute, an untouchable right to be defended 
against all attempts to limit it. 
One of the effects, if not one of the purposes, of Utopia 
was to answer a man whom More had never read, namely 
Machiavelli. Parts of Utopia, it has been remarked before 
this, read like a comment on The Prince. In judging crimes, 
the Utopians look not to the overt results but "count the 
A 
inteat and pretensed purpose as evil as the act or deed 
itself."2i Agreements between princes are kept of course in 
Europe, says the narrator Raphael with obvious irony, but 
in the new world where Utopia is situated, princes End 
loop-holes in treaties by crafty dodges which they would 
loudly condemn if used in private dealings. So out there it 
looks as if there are two kinds of justice: 
. . . the one meet for the inferior sort of people, going afoot 
and creeping low by the ground, and bound down on every 
side with many bands so that it shall not run at rovers. The 
other a princely virtue, which like as it is of higher majestie 
than the other poor justice, so also it is of much more liberty, 
as to the which nothing is unlawful that it lusteth after.25 
The result is that the Utopians make no formal alliances 
whatever in the belief that "men be better and more surely 
knit together by love and benevolence than by covenants 
of leagues."" Only two years before, Machiavelli had re- 
marked, "The experience of our times shows those princes 
to have done great things who have had IittIe regard for 
good faith . . . and who have ultimately overcome those 
who have made loyalty their foundation"; therefore, "a pm- 
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dent ruler ought not to keep faith when by so doing it 
would be against his interest." "Everybody sees what you 
appear to be, few feel what you are," Machiavelli con- 
cluded; "the end justses the means"; therefore let a prince 
aim at "conquering and maintaining the state, and the means 
will always be judged honorable and praised by every one, 
for the vulgar is always taken by appearances and the issue 
of the event- and the world consists only of the vulgar. . . ."'' 
The issue between personal morality and ')princely virtue" 
has never been stated better. 
The chief dillerence between Machiavelli's thought-world 
and that of More, however, cannot be illustrated by direct 
quotation. It has to do with time and change. Utopia is a 
completely static society. Since its foundation by King 
Utopus there has been no significant change, no develop- 
ment, no "history" in fact, and presumably there will be 
no change in the future. The assumptions underlying Utopia 
are: first, that evil is essentially social as well as individual, 
and so any effective attack on it must be through the creation 
of a new social structure, a new environment; second, this 
environment, once it is created, will curb and control indi- 
vidual tendencies to evil, even if it will not entirely root out 
human sin; and third, there are timeless rules of reason 
which may be discovered and used in designing this new 
social structure. With much of this Machiavelli, especially in 
The Discourses, would agree. But Machiavelli couId never 
escape from the time dimension as the Utopians succeed in 
doing. His test of a prince was ability to change with "times 
and circumstances," his test of a republic was ability to 
endure in time and expand in space. Nothing is at rest in 
The Prince and The Discourses; eveiything is at rest in 
Utopia. To Machiavelli the real world is a continuous strug- 
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gle for power between competing vitalities; to More, in 
Utopia, it is a world in which power can be controlled and 
disciplined, nay even rendered harmless. Machiavelli is con- 
sciously an intellectual revolutionary, always striving for a 
''new order," a 'new route." More is a conservative who 
pictures a society, built on reason, devoting an enormous 
part of its energy simply to preserving the status quo. 
More's picture is worth examining more closely. Utopia 
is an artificial island-it was King Utopus who dug the 
fifteen-mile channel that separates it from the continent. 
Geographical isolation both makes possible and intensifies 
the Utopians' psychological isolation from their neighbors. 
What holds the rather loose federation of Utopian cities 
together is national sentiment, as we would call it-pride in 
the Utopian way of life, which the inhabitants know is quite 
different from that of others and which must thus be jeal- 
ously protected and preser~ed."~ There are all kinds of in- 
genious devices to preserve the status quo, to keep the 
number in each family constant, to keep the population at a 
constant level, to balance trade, and to maintain inter- 
national peace so that the Utopian welfare state may 
not be disturbed in its enjoyment of the good life. The 
Utopians are far more wealthy and powerful than any of 
their neighbors, and so they go to war only in c'just" causes. 
The list of ccjust" causes is rather long, it must be confessed, 
and includes resistance to Utopian colonization of backward 
areas and injuries done to merchants of allied powers, The 
Utopians use their overwhelming power only to execute 
right and justice-and in Raphael's account of it, their 
neighbors seem to grant the Utopians' moral and cultural 
superiority as good grounds for their policy. In fact, there 
is a strong streak of moral righteousness in all that they do. 
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They are harder on their own condemned criminals than on 
their foreign slaves "because they being so godly brought 
up to virtue in so excellent a commonwealth" still went 
wrong." Their principal objective in going to war is "to ob- 
tain that thing, which if they had before obtained, they 
would not have moved battle9'-an excellent ~rinciple too 
seldom followed by belligerents, But, the account continues, 
"if that be not possible, they take so cruel vengeance of them 
which be in the fault, that ever after they be afeared to do 
the like."30 Because Utopian manhood is so precious, they 
prefer to fight by the crafty use of money and propaganda, 
and by tricks which would delight a Machiavellian. They 
use their friends' and allies' troops before their own. But 
if they are finally forced to fight, they fight hard, knowing 
they are in the right, and they impose s t 8  indemnities on 
their defeated victims. 
I t  took German historians like Ritter to point out that this 
insular self-righteousness, which is such an amusing char- 
acteristic of Utopian policy, is not unlike some later aspects 
of British foreign policy." With no land frontier to defend, 
it was hard for Englishmen to understand the Machiavellism 
of continental powers which were caught in the continuous 
struggle for power, and easy for them to read the moral 
law to their obstreperous neighbors. The unconscious 
assumption of English statesmen often was that a free 
people's acts could not be anything but moral, whereas the 
acts of continental despotisms would ipso fact0 be immoral. 
Further, it was natural for the British to equate morality 
with preserving the status quo and immorality with upsetting 
it. I t  is certainly not fair to burden More with any responsi- 
bility for forming later British policy. But it is sound to 
point out, as Ritter does, that More was thoroughly medieval 
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in his belief in timeless standards of right and justice, that 
he thought the use of power justified only as a means of 
enforcing right or justice, and that war made sense to him 
only as an instrument of justice meting out punishment- 
not as a more or less natural result of competing wills-to- 
live, as it looked to Machiavelli. More believed that: power 
could be harnessed and tamed by righteousness. But his later 
German critics are justified in asking the embarrassing ques- 
tion: how would those neighboring backward peoples really 
feel about the high-and-mighty Utopians, with their gold 
which they never enjoy, their "dumping" policy in foreign 
trade, their big citizen arniy, and thej.r high moral princi- 
ples? Is the struggle for power abolished by imagining it out 
of existence? Or does it slip in by the back door after the 
moralist has bolted and barred the front? More's Utopia is 
the work of a conscientious Christian humanist, humane 
and civilized in spirit. But there is a streak of moralism and 
self-righteousness in it that is related to the later More who 
conscientiously supported the burning of heretics. 
Now let us return to the author of this lively description 
of an imaginary island, back from the embassy to the Nether- 
lands at the end of 1515, and leading his friend Peter Giles 
to believe that the manuscript would very soon appear in 
print-. I t  did not appear for over a year, and when it did, 
it was expanded to include a marvelous dialogue between 
the narrator, Raphael Hythlodaye, Peter Giles, and Thomas 
More himself. This was sandwiched in between the first 
five pages of the original version and the actual description 
of Utopia. Why was this dialogue added, and what does it 
mean in the light of all we know about More himself? 
The first to answer these questions convincingly, it seems 
to me, has been Professor Hexter in the study I have already 
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menti~ned.~' In brief, there is strong indirect evidence that 
More was wrestling hard in the summer of 1516 with the 
most important problem a Christian intellectual can face: 
to what extent must he be responsible for carrying out his 
ideas himself if the opportunity is offered? Erasmus was with 
him in the summer of 1516, and the presumption is that 
there were long talks between them about Henry VIII's 
pressure on More to become a privy councilor. No one 
knows how Erasmus argued, but the way he lived out the 
answer himself is well known. The calling oi a Christian 
scholar is a high one, he might have maintained. I t  takes 
a11 of a man's time and energy. Furthermore, it requires 
absolute independence and integrity. You cannot be com- 
mitted to spending a certain number of hours a day at 
court and still study and write. More important, you cannot 
be the servant of a King and still think you are free to speak 
and write as your mind and conscience dictate. Either you 
commit yourself to the truly important task, the re-education 
of Christendom through restoration of the best in classical 
and Christian antiquity, or you become so entangled in 
worldly affairs that your tongue and pen lose their cutting 
edge, and you no longer are an intellectual and a reformer 
worthy of the name. I repeat: Erasmus may or may not have 
spoken thus to More, but this was really what he had bet 
his own life on-and More himself had strong sympathies 
with this point of view. Could he not argue that to have 
written the description of Utopia was enough? Let others 
read it and work out the applications. The important thing 
was the intellectual's task of seeing things clearly and pre- 
senting the truth persuasively, 
There was another side to More, however-the lawyer, the 
man of affairs, the realist. In Utopia he remembers that his 
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old mentor, Cardinal Morton, had served Henry VII well. 
"The King put much trust in his counsel, the weal public 
also in a manner leaned unto him," he says.33 In sixteenth- 
century Europe, kings had the power, and to counsel kings 
successfully was to put new ideas into effect and to bring 
about the public good. How could a Christian humanist, 
who honestly believed in the ideals embodied in Utopia, 
refuse the opportunity to implement them by counseling a 
king if offered the chance? 
All this is argued out in the dialogue between Raphael 
Hythlodaye and More in the First Book of Utopia.'Vith his 
vast experience of other societies, Raphael should offer his 
services to a king, says More. Never, says Raphael. Imagine 
me in the French King's Council. The question for discus- 
sion is how the king can hold onto Milan, recover Naples, 
conquer Venice, gobble up the Netherlands, and still avoid 
a stab in the back by England. If I stand up and say: Turn 
over a new leaf, gentlemen; learn a new lesson; my advice 
is to stay out of Italy and Flanders entirely; there is enough 
to do in providing good government for a Iarge country 
like France without wasting the nation's blood in foreign 
conquest-who would listen to me in such a hard-headed 
group? In such a situation, who listens to a man who brings 
up something he linows was done in times past or has seen 
done in some other place? 
Well, says More, I did not mean that you should make 
yourself ridiculous by always proposing impossibly idealistic 
policies. This "school philosophy" naturally has no place in 
royal councils, Eut there is a more tactful and diplomatic 
way, a "philosophy more civil." This is to "handle the matter 
wittily," and to see that what you can't turn to good still does 
not come out too badly. "You must not leave and forsake 
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the commonwealth; you must not forsake the ship in a 
tempest [simply] because you cannot rule and keep down 
the winds," he says to Ra~hael . '~ 
Raphael is unconvinced. Either he must speak the truth 
or remain silent, he says. He is afraid that More's "crafty 
and subtle" approach really amounts to compromising with 
the truth. Furthermore, it is almost impossible to conceal 
your real opinions in a royal council. Unless you go along 
with wicked and foolish decisions of the majority, you will 
quickly be accounted a spy or even a traitor. And if you do 
go along with the decisions, the wickedness and folly will 
of course be attributed to you by the outside world. This is 
the last word, and Eaphael, representing More's "pure intel- 
lectual" side, speaks it. But the dialogue is obviously the 
work of a man deeply divided in mind and heart. 
This was where the argument was left when Utopia went 
to the printer in Louvain under Erasmus' supervision in De- 
cember, 1516. For two more years More held out. Then what 
the English weathercasters call a '%right spell" seemed to 
pass over the political landscape. Wolsey began to defend 
the poor against enclosures, the King became strongly peace- 
minded, and the future looked bright.3G More entered the 
royal service and soon he was privy councilor, Speaker of 
the House of Commons, and finally Lord Chancellor. His 
career as an independent Christian humanist, as a reforming 
inteIIectua1, ceased (as he had seen it would) and his prepa- 
ration for martyrdom began (as he had dimly sensed it 
would), Raphael's predictions came true, one by one. More 
made it clear to the king that he disagreed with the divorce 
proceedings, but that he would remain silent in public. 
Thomas Cromwell, however, with his clear MachiavelIian 
vision, saw that it was More's refusal to say what he could 
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not believe that was "making others so s t 8  as they be." And 
so, because he stood in the way of a revolution, More was 
condemned for treason on perjured testimony and sent to the 
block-twenty years after Utopia was conceived and three 
years after the appearance in print of MachiavelIi's Prince 
and The Discourses. In a sense he had deliberately ended his 
career as a Christian humanist and reformer when he entered 
the royal service, in order to attest his belief that an intel- 
lectual must be ultimately willing to put his ideas to the 
test of practice, and that a Christian, like his Master, must be 
ready to be crucified for his beliefs. 
I have tried to sketch the contrasting development of the 
two great political analysts of the early sixteenth century. 
Each in his own way tried to probe to the roots of the be- 
wildering social evils of his day. Each tried like a good 
intellectual to see things whole, to expIore every relevant 
resource in tradition, to use every important piece of evi- 
dence from history and contemporary experience. In trying 
to see things whole, they got the desire to set things straight. 
Or perhaps it is just as correct to say that their desire to 
set things straight drove them to the mental effort of seeing 
things whole. 
They did not reach the same conclusions, of course. They 
digered-profoundly and fundamentally-in spite of much in 
common. And this points up the truth-or is it a truism? 
-that humanistic knowledge is not like scientific knowledge. 
It does not accumulate, like the sedimentary laye-rs which 
eventually form a single, solid rock. Rather it grows like a 
group of organisms which are like each other and yet each 
one unique, intimately dependent on their surrounding en- 
vironment of light, air, and nourishment, always subject to 
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the possibility of annihilation. Where insight and evaluation 
are involved, the humanist turns to the best he knows of an- 
cient wisdom on a subject and uses this wisdom as an essen- 
tial intellectual resource in a fresh and realistic analysis of 
his own particular historical situation. Times change, but 
are never altogether different. The world of Plato, the world 
of Thomas More, and the world of today are very different, 
but they are not so different that Plato and More are irrel- 
evant to us. A modern physicist need not know much about 
Aristotle or how he arrived at his ideas of motion. To be sure, 
he builds on Newton's laws, but he cares little about how 
Newton came to formulate them. The historical and bio- 
graphical detail which has fonned the substance of these lec- 
tures, however, is important to the humanist because the 
way intellectuals become social reformers, the way their hu- 
man experience contributes to their social insight, is still 
relevant to us. And their conclusions are still alive in a way 
those of the medieval astrologer are not alive for the modern 
scientist. The antinomy of realism and moralism in the analy- 
sis of politics, for instance, must be argued through for each 
generation, in the light of its particular historical circum- 
stances and needs. In  their day Machiavelli and More seemed 
utterly irreconcilable. To Machiavelli the ceaseless struggle 
for power must be accepted as one of the brute facts of life. 
You can leal-n how to use it, he might say; and in certain 
ideal circumstances you can balance power against power 
and so attain a certain stability and order; but you can never 
tame power, never outlaw it  or ignore it. To Thomas More 
in Utopia, on the other hand, the struggle for power may 
be so curbed and contained by the proper structure of law 
and right that for all practical purposes its capacity for evil 
can be forgotten. The causes of ambition and sedition have 
been so skillfully "plucked up by the roots" in Utopia that the 
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society will "endure for ever" and no foreign prince will be 
able to shake it, Raphael says.37 And so the Machiavellian 
and the Utopian come down to us from the sixteenth century 
as symbols of an eternaI contradiction. The Machiavellian 
sees nothing but material power and is blind to moral and 
spiritual forces; the Utopian overestimates moral forces and 
thinks he can exorcise the demon of power in the end. 
From this distance, however, it looks as if we are dealing 
not with contradiction or paradox in the case of Machiavelli 
u e 9 9 ~ s  More, but with what our scientist friends would call 
complementarity. Obviously no government that ignores the 
pure power factors in its position will survive long-nor wiIl 
one that fails to convert naked power into some structure 
of right. Pascal summed it up a centuiy later in that bitter, 
penetrating way he had of stabbing to the heart of the 
matter: "Justice without might is helpless; might without 
justice is tyrannical. . . . We must therefore combine justice 
and might, and for this end make what is just strong, or what 
is strong just. . . . Being unable to cause might to obey 
justice, men have made it just to obey might. Unable to 
strengthen justice, they have justified might."3s Pascal's irony 
is Machiavelli's, but his underlying faith is More's. 
And so the dialectic continues from generation to genera- 
tion. To know the history of the argument, to know its 
greatest protagonists, is to add perspective and depth to our 
own self-understanding. Where and by whom is the dialectic 
being carried forward today? One would naturally look for 
it in the United States, the power of long isolationist tradition 
and strong moral beliefs, much like the Utopians in some 
ways, but recently shocked out of its complacency by being 
thrust into a deadly competition for existence with a ruthless 
power of equal strength. And I think you may find a hint of 
it at least in the writings of two distinguished statesmen who 
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have also qualified at different times as intellectuals and 
reformers: George Kennan and John Foster Dulles. You 
notice I say their "writings." It is too early to judge the 
active careers of either, but each wrote books and articles 
around mid-century which were written rapidly and urgently 
for the general reader, to inform and to reform, much as 
Machiavelli's Prince and More's Utopia were written.3Q 
In fact, there are amusing parallels here between the 
sixteenth and twentieth centuries. Mr. Kennan, a distin- 
guished career diplomat, organizer of the Policy Planning 
Staff of the State Department, ambassador to the Kremlin 
and outstanding expert on Russia, was allowed to "retire" 
from the foreign service in April, 1953, at the age of forty- 
nine, because the new administration had campaigned 
against the "containment" policy which he had fathered and 
so found no use for him. He has since turned to history, 
like Machiavelli in his retirement, and is engaged in a full- 
dress study of America and the Russian Revolution, the first 
volume of which has won wide acclaim. Mr. Dulles, it is 
said, had been preparing himself for the Secretaryship of 
State since childhood-with somewhat more zest than 
Thomas More prepared himself for the royal service. As 
part of this preparation he wrote extensively on the genera1 
subject of foreign policy before he attained his lifelong 
ambition in January of 1953. And so, like Machiavelli, Mr. 
Kennan may be considered a statesman more or less involun- 
tarily turned intellectual, Like More, Mr. Dulles was a 
lawyer and intellectual who ultimately became an active 
statesman. As in the case of Machiavelli and More, there is 
much in common between them, and much in sharp dispute. 
Mr. Kennan urges us to see the world as it is, not as it 
might be if all peoples were like the American. Power is 
the central fact in the world of diplomacy, and it is better 
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in the long run to devise means of balancing power by old- 
fashioned diplomacy, he thinks, than to ignore the power 
factor (which is dangerous), or to rely on legalistic restraints 
(which is futile). "This is a hard and cruel world we live in," 
he writes. Other nations don't exactly see us as we see 
ourselves-peace-loving, law-abiding, willing to live and let 
live. The rest of the world is not ready to federate in a nice 
reasonable way as our original thirteen states did; in fact it is 
not even willing to preserve the status quo which is so favor- 
able to us. The most serious fault in twentieth-century 
American foreign policy is what Kennan calls "the legalistic- 
moralistic approach to international problems": our faith in 
arbitration treaties, pacts solemnly outlawing war, schemes 
for international organization which we expect too much of 
and so become disillusioned with."O Our legalism easily be- 
comes moral superiority; our wars too readily become wars 
for righteousness, which means that they are total wars 
and can only end in total defeats-and this will spell disaster 
for both sides in an atomic world. We tend to apply our 
individual moral standards too naively to international af- 
fairs, "We cannot, when it comes to dealings between gov- 
ernments, assign to moral values the same significance we 
give them in personal life." We can-and Mr. Kennan fer- 
vently hopes we will-follow moral metlzods in our diplo- 
macy. But personal morality can never be a valid test of the 
purposes of a state, nor "a criterion for measuring and com- 
paring the behavior of different states."41 We would do 
better, he thinks, if as a people we were less eager to appear 
morally superior, and more willing to accept the fact that we 
are a great power which has to do some of the things great 
powers have always had to do to survive-and not be 
ashamed about it. Lest you think from this that Mr. Kennan 
is Machiavelli reincarnated, I hasten to add that he is a 
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sincere Presbyterian layman and writes, "I do not wish to 
see the conduct of this nation in its foreign relations animated 
by anything else than decency, generosity, moderation, and 
consideration for others."42 But the a£Enity to the best in 
Machiavelli's realism is evident enough, this time rooted in 
a kind of Christian pessimism. 
Mr. Dulles is another Presbyterian layman of a somewhat 
more familiar Calvinist stamp. There is much in his book 
War m Peace? (1950) with which Mr. Kennan would agree, 
but the whole tone and temper is different. He believes 
that "in the pattern of our own national life we can find the 
pattern for world pea~e.""~ Peace can be "patterned," then, 
and the pattern can be found in the federation of the thirteen 
colonies and the drafting of the Constitution. The United 
States became great because of its people's moral beliefs 
and spiritual convictions, now unfortunately submerged by 
materialism. Only by recovering her faith in her spiritual 
destiny can America combat Communism. Where Kennan 
tends to emphasize the danger from Russia, the world power, 
Dulles tends to emphasize the threat of Communist ideology. 
"Power is the key of success in dealing with the Soviet 
leadership," he writes. But he continues: "Power, of course, 
includes not merely militaly power, but economic power and 
the intangibles, such as moral judgement and world opinion, 
which determine what men do and the intensity with which 
they do it.""* As one reads on, one realizes that we are in 
a battle of creeds far more than a conflict of world powers. 
Mr. DuEes would have us fight like the Utopians, first by 
propaganda before we draw the sword. He has great faith in 
legal structures, moral arguments, and non-material forces. 
Like the Utopians, he has no doubt about who is right and 
who is wrong (he has often been ready to treat both friend 
and foe to little lectures on the subject as he steps aboard 
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planes). But at his best he has the same rugged sense of right 
combined with realistic grasp of politics that characterized 
Thomas More's thinking-albeit in Presbyterian rather than 
papal garb. 
And so there is nothing really new in the world of political 
thought after all. But the corollary is that the big issues are 
never old and stale either. I had thought that I was more or 
less "original" in my feeling that George Kennan represents 
the realistic pole of contemporary American thinking about 
international affairs and John Foster DuUes the moralistic, 
until I picked up a little book by a French-Swiss writer, 
M. Louis Brandt-Peltier, called Conceptions amhicaines de 
politique e'trangdre: Kennan, Dulles (Paris, 1953). The author 
draws the polar contrast between the two even more sharply 
than I have. America did not become great mereIy through 
her moral and spiritual convictions, he points out slyly in 
reply to DuUes: geographical isolation and the protection 
of the British navy had something to do with it. Europe pre- 
fers a "materialistic" to a moralistic America, he hints. Euro- 
peans can accept American economic superiority, he says, 
but Lord help them if the United States undergoes a religi- 
ous reform and becomes possessed of some new sense of 
"Manifest Destiny" to reform the world! He concludes dryly: 
"What America needs most is to be enlightened, not re- 
formed.JL45 
It may be that enlightenment and reform are more closely 
related than M. Brandt-Peltier thinks they are. At least 
Machiavelli and Thomas More thought so. To each in dif- 
ferent ways the impulse to reform was integrally related to 
the impulse to understand. The intellectual as social reformer 
has his faults, as is perfectly evident in our two subjects 
themselves. He is apt to see the social landscape in too sharp 
relief of black and white, and he is prone to exaggerate the 
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rationality of men. But if we are going to have reformers- 
and we are, of course-there is a good deal to be said for the 
proposition that it is better to have men whose itch to 
change society has grown out of the scholar's desire to grasp 
the complexities of the social structure than to suffer under 
the ignorant fanatics and "dim-witted saints" (the phrase is 
William James's) who clutter the pages of history. 
But it is time for me to leave you to think over for your- 
selves whether you would vote for realism or moralism the 
next time you have the chance. The argument is still un- 
settled. Your vote can still affect the results. And if you have 
got anything at all out of these talks, you may be conscious 
of Machiavelli and Thomas More peering over your shoulder 
as you debate the issue within yourself. 
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